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This thesis was completed as partial requirement for the award of a 
 
Clinical Psychology Doctorate. 
 
 
The first volume contains the research component of the thesis. The 
research compared individuals diagnosed with depression and individuals 
without any psychiatric diagnosis on the extent that they engaged in 
depressive rumination and on their ability to manipulate the contents of 
their short-term memory. The research findings suggest that individuals 
with a diagnosis of depression and who ruminated, experience difficulty 
altering the contents of their working memory when presented with 
neutrally valenced stimuli. This deficit in the cognitive control of working 
memory in depressed participants who ruminate could explain why they 
have difficulty stopping themselves from engaging in depressive 
rumination, a condition that exacerbates both the symptoms as well as 
the duration of a depressive episode. 
 
A literature review of the current treatments of depressive rumination 
identified that current treatments are underpinned by the intention either 
to reappraise cognitive content or to break the association between 
behaviours and emotional states, omitting to investigate the potential 
benefits that improving the ability to control short-term memory may have 
on reducing the symptom of depressive rumination. 
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The second volume contains five clinical practice reports. The first clinical 
practice report demonstrates how a cognitive behaviour formulation and a 
systemic formulation can be utilised to explain the presented difficulties of 
an individual with learning disabilities. The second clinical practice report 
shows the findings of a service evaluation investigating the usefulness of 
multi-disciplinary team meetings in a learning disability service. The third 
clinical practice report demonstrates how the single-case design can 
inform the measurement of the effectiveness of an intervention aiming to 
improve the symptoms of anxiety in an ‘older’ adult. The fourth clinical 
practice report is a case study. It describes the therapeutic process with 
an individual with dual diagnosis in a secure setting. Finally, clinical 
practice report five is a summary of an orally delivered case study of a 
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Depressive rumination is a type of repetitive thought with deleterious 
effect on mental health. Depressive rumination is associated with deficits 
in the control of working memory and has been shown to be a robust 
predictor of onset and severity of a depressive episode. Consequently, a 
number of therapeutic approaches for depression endeavour to remediate 
depressive rumination either directly or by proxy in an effort to alleviate 
depressed mood and to prevent relapse. Maintenance of depressed mood 
has been argued to be the result of a deficit in the ability to regulate 
depressiogenic cognitive structures. This review investigates which of 





A computerised search using key words was conducted on a number of 
academic databases to identify peer-reviewed articles documenting the 
efficacy of treatments of depressive rumination. Additional references 
were obtained through the references section of relevant articles and 
chapters. The resulting articles were arranged thematically under their 
respective intervention within two broad groups: interventions aimed at 





Results identified evidence for both cognitive interventions, such as 
cognitive therapy, metacognitive therapy and mindfulness therapy, and for 
behavioural interventions, such as distraction, aversion behavioural 





Current therapeutic treatments of depressive rumination appear to 
privilege interventions targeting the reappraisal of cognitive content and 
the disruption of activation of mood congruent cognitions, whilst omitting 
to directly remediate the structural deficit in cognitive inhibition of 
depressiogenic thoughts. Treatments such as cognitive remediation 
therapy can target such structural cognitive deficits. The article proposes 
that future research needs to investigate the effectiveness of such 






Keywords: cognitive inhibition, depression, intervention, response 
styles theory, rumination, treatment. 
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Response Styles Theory, Cognitive Inhibition and Treatments of 
 





Helpful and Unhelpful Repetitive Thinking 
 
Repetitive thought is defined as the “process of thinking attentively, 
repetitively or frequently about one’s self and one’s world” (Segerstorm, 
Stanton, Alden & Shortbridge, 2003, p. 909). Depressive rumination is a 
form of repetitive thought that may be differentiated from other forms of 
repetitive thoughts by (a) its negative emotional valence, (b) its relatively 
fixed and invariant content of cognition, (c) its focus upon internal 
representations rather than on-going experience and (d) because the 
ruminative process does not aid in problem-solving by producing novel 
interpretations, evaluations or strategies with respect to the ruminative 
content. Repetitive and recurrent thinking is a common experience in the 
absence of psychopathology. In fact, it is argued that repetitive thought is 
an everyday mental process engaged by all people (Harvey, Watkins, 
Mansell & Shafran, 2004). 
 
Repetitive thoughts may have both helpful and unhelpful consequences, 
whereas depressive rumination has only unconstructive sequelae. A 
helpful repetitive thought can take the form of problem-solving, planning 
and mental simulation, for example. Problem-solving involves a number of 
stages, such as definition of the problem, generation of alternative 
solutions, implementation of the chosen solution and evaluation of its 
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effectiveness (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). All stages of problem-solving 
may involve repetitive thinking. Mental simulation also involves the 
repeated mental rehearsal of a situation where the desired outcome is 
achieved. Mental simulation can form an important coping strategy 
whereby rehearsal of possible events can lead to mastery of optimal 
behaviours for those events (Pham & Taylor, 1999). Another example of 
constructive repetitive thought is counterfactual thinking, whereby one 
generates imagined mental representations of alternative versions of the 
past (Roese, 1997), thus increasing the likelihood in overcoming similar 
difficulties in the future. Defensive pessimism is also an example of 
constructive repetitive thoughts. It is characterised by setting low 
expectations for future outcomes whilst thinking of the worst case 
scenario and planning ahead on how to overcome it (Spencer & Norem, 
1996). Helpful repetitive thought patterns can aid emotion regulation and 
are associated with reduced psychopathology. 
 
In the literature on depressive rumination, repetitive thought is more 
commonly associated with unconstructive thinking. Depressive rumination 
is only one construct associated with unconstructive thinking, worrying 
being another seemingly similar construct associated with 
psychopathology. Although there can be considerable overlap between 
these constructs, it is generally accepted that they lead to separate 
expressions of psychopathology. For example, worrying has generally been 
defined as directing one’s attention to “a chain of thoughts and images, 
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negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable”, in anticipation of a 
future event, which contains the possibility of one or more negative 
outcomes, with the intention of proactively problem-solving that issue 
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & Depree, 1983, p. 10). Depressive 
rumination is differentiated from worrying in that depressive rumination is 
not characterised by an intention to problem-solve. Instead, it appears to 
act as an emotion regulation strategy, a “mode of responding to distress 
that involves the repeated and passive direction of attentional resources 
on memories of symptoms of distress and on the possible causes and 
consequences of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, Lyubomirsky, 
 
2008, p. 400). 
 
 
The cognitive content of both worrying and depressive rumination is 
characterised by negative emotional valence. Worrying tends to be 
associated with repetitive thoughts about the anticipation of an uncertain 
future event and the experience of symptoms of anxiety, whereas 
depressive rumination tends to be associated with repetitive thoughts 






Cross-sectional studies (Riso, du Toit, Blandino, Penna, Dacey, Duin et al., 
 
2003) using the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksma, 
 
1991a, Nolen-Hoeksma, 1991b ) show that depressive rumination is 
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elevated for both currently depressed participants as well as participants 
who have been previously depressed but were in remission at the time of 
investigation. Depressive rumination has also been found to be associated 
with symptoms of depression in children, adolescents and adults (Abela, 
Vanderbilt & Rochon, 2004; Ito, Tornita, Hasui, Otsuka, Katayama, 
Kawarmura, et al., 2003; Kuyken, Watkind, Holden & Cook, 2006). Using 
the same measure, prospective longitudinal studies have found that 
depressive rumination predicts depressive symptoms in patients with 
clinical depression, after controlling for baseline depression (Rhoan, 
Sigmon & Dorhofer, 2003) and that it predicts depressive symptoms across 
a range of follow-up periods in initially non-depressed participants (e.g. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade & Bohon, 2007; Sakamoto, Kambara 
& Tanno, 2001), in addition to the future onset of a major depressive 
episode across a range of follow-up periods in initially non-depressed 
participants (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). 
 
 
The Response Styles Theory 
 
The response styles theory (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991a) has received 
considerable attention within the literature on depressive rumination 
(Abela, Brozina & Haigh, 2002; Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Fredrickson, 
 
1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Sarin, Abela & 
Auerbach, 2005; Strauss, Muday, McNall & Wong, 1997). The response 
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styles theory postulates that rumination is a trait-like style of responding 
to low mood. This unhelpful response style exacerbates and prolongs 
distress, in particular the symptoms of depressive disorder. It is argued 
that it does this through four mechanisms. 
 
First, rumination enhances the effects of depressed mood on thinking. 
Consequently, it is more likely that people will utilise the negative 
memories and thoughts activated by their low mood to make sense of 
their current circumstances. Teasdale and colleagues (Clark & Teasdale, 
1985; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980; 
 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins, Teasdale, Williams, 2000) have clearly 
demonstrated the effect of depressed mood on thinking by the selective 
priming of mood-congruent information and memories, beliefs and 
expectations. The mood congruent priming of depressiogenic mental 
representation serves to further intensify negative mood, producing a self- 
perpetuating cycle of negative cognitive content and dysphoric mood. A 
considerable body of research supports the idea that self-focus can 
amplify the effect of negative mood on thinking (e.g. Pyszczynki & 




Secondly, rumination exacerbates and prolongs depressed mood by 
generating fatalistic and pessimistic biases when the individual engages in 
problem-solving. It appears that the combination of low mood and 
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rumination is depressiogenic. Studies on individuals who have recently 
experienced low mood due to naturally occurring stress or traumatic life 
events, who routinely ruminate, experience more severe and longer 
periods of low mood than individuals who use an alternative emotion 
regulation strategy (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001). Experimental studies which use rumination induction to 
dysphoric participants demonstrate a negative bias and distorted 
interpretations of imaginary life events such as overgeneralising failures 
whilst dismissing successes (Lyubomisky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Greenberg, Pyszczynki, Burling & Tibbs, 1992). In addition, similar 
methodologies demonstrate that ruminators experience less agency and 
make more negative self-evaluations (Lyubomirksy, Tucker, Caldwell & 
Berg, 1999). 
 
Thirdly, rumination hinders motivation and promotes engaging in unhelpful 
behaviours leading to increases in stressful circumstances. For example, 
when some individuals experience low or dysphoric mood, they may avoid 
social contact, brood about their problems, dwell upon the consequences 
and causes of their depressed symptoms, whilst not taking any action to 
proactively solve their problems (Lyubormirsky, Tucker, Caldwell & Berg, 
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996). In a field study, women who employed a 
ruminative style experienced higher distress upon discovering symptoms 
of potential physical illness, which led them to delay seeking appropriate 
medical advice (Lyubomirsky, Kasri & Chang, 2003). 
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Finally, depressive rumination could hinder or eliminate protective and 
repairing strategies that might moderate the effects of depressed mood. 
For example, social support has been widely demonstrated to moderate 
the effects of depressed mood (Brown, Andrews, Harris, Adler, & Bridge, 
2009; George, Blazer, Hughes, & Fowler, 1989). There is evidence that 
chronic ruminators are perceived unfavourably by others (Schwartz & 
McCombs Thomas, 1995) and tend to have less social support available to 
them (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). This could be there result of 
experiencing heightened feelings of vengeance (McCullough, Bellah, 
Kilpatrick & Johnson, 2001), responding with increased aggression when 
provoked (Collins & Bell, 1997) and tending to experience dependency 
towards other people (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). 
 
 
Cognitive Inhibition and Emotion Regulation in Depression The 
response styles theory argues a trait-like quality to depressive 
rumination. Convergent findings from experimental cognitive psychology 
(e.g. Mayr & Keele, 2000) as well as neuroimaging (see Banich, 
Mackiewicz, Cepue, Whitmer, Miller & Heller, 2009) have highlighted the 
role of cognitive inhibition of working memory in the aetiology of 
rumination. 
 
Working memory is a limited capacity memory system that provides 
temporary access to a set of mental representations in the service of on- 
going cognitive processing (Miyake & Shah, 1999). Since the capacity of 
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working memory is limited, its contents must be frequently updated if the 
representations are to be sustained over time. Similarly, mental 
representations must be “switched” into and out of working memory 
according to the particular task demands operant at that time. 
 
In order to switch between representations in working memory, the no 
longer relevant information must be depotentiated or inhibited and the 
newly attended representations must be potentiated. Inhibition of no 
longer relevant information may be achieved automatically through 
competitive inhibition or by self-directed attempts to reallocate attentional 
resources away from the no longer relevant representations. 
 
Impairment of self-directed inhibitory mechanisms would result in reduced 
intentional control of working memory representations and in working 
memory become potentiated by non-goal relevant stimuli (e.g., attention 
being “grabbed” by the emotional content of the stimuli). Furthermore, 
the decrease in intentional control of working memory may impede ability 
to re-evaluate or reappraise automatic reaction to the stimulus (in that the 
attentional capture by the immediate properties of the stimuli cannot be 
over-ridden by intentional inhibition). Failure to switch attention away 
from the ruminative theme could result in maintenance of depressive 
mood via selective priming of mood-congruent semantic representations 
becoming more available for the appraisal of on-going experience. 
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The model presented by Joorman (2010; Figure 1) suggests that negative 
events trigger mood congruent retrieval of negatively toned cognitions 
and memories with which to interpret on-going experience. With 
impairment of the inhibition in working memory the individual will 
experience greater difficulty switching from negative toned cognitions and 
memories, resulting in increased rumination on depressiogenic themes, 
decreased reappraisal of on-going experience and thus further reinforcing 
the accessibility of negative themed memories and appraisals. Overtime, 
this process increases long-term retrieval of negative toned material, and 
reinforces the axiomatic acceptance of the content of depressiogenic 
rumination. Indeed, the ability to control working memory has been 







From this model, it follows that successful psychological interventions 
should target one or more of the following modalities: 
 
• Reduce the mood valence and activation of negative cognitions 
 
(segment A of the model in Figure 1). 
 
• Remediate the deficits in cognitive inhibition and improve control of 




The following sections of this article detail a conceptual narrative review 
aiming to identify the predominant treatment modalities used by current 
interventions targeting the symptoms of depressive rumination. The 
review is not an exhaustive attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
various treatments on depressive rumination. Rather, it tries to identify 
the driving principles of the existing interventions and suggest future 
directions drawing form empirical conceptualisations of depressive 
rumination. Through this review, it becomes apparent that psychological 
interventions underutilise techniques that intent to remediate the deficit in 
cognitive inhibition directly. This conceptual narrative review article argues 
that interventions remediating the ability of cognitive inhibition may prove 
a successful approach to address this deficit directly and break the 
cognitive maintenance cycle of depression and or prevent against relapse. 
The review suggests that further research is required in the use of 








A computerised search using keyword terms was conducted to identify 
publications investigating treatments of rumination for depression, 
included the following terms (using wild cards, such as depres* for 
depression, depressed and depressive). The terms were split into two lists 
(Table 1), the first list contained references to depression and the second 
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list contained references to rumination. Each term from the first list was 
combined with each term from the second list using the Boolean term 
‘AND’. The terms were entered into a number of academic databases (i.e. 
PsycINFO, Web of Science, MEDLINE) from the beginning point of that 
database until April 2012. In addition, relevant chapters (e.g. 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003b) and the reference lists of the obtained 








Terms used for the identification of relevant studies. 
 
 
List 1 List 2 
 
Depres* (-ed, -ing, -ive) Ruminat* (-ion, -ive, -ing) 
 
Low mood Reflect* (-ion, -ive, -ing) 
Dysthymi* (-ic, -ia) Worr* (-y, -ing) 
Mental Ill* (-, -ness) Rehears* (-al, -ing) 
Hopeless* (-, -ness) Chew over 
Contemplat* (-e, -ive, -ion) 
Regurg* (-itate, -itaton) 
Repetit* (-ion, -ive) 




The search strategy resulted in 1043 papers. Of those papers, studies were 
excluded if they were not peer-reviewed and did not report the outcome of 
a psychological intervention with explicit reference to depressive 
rumination. In addition, studies were excluded from this review if the 
intervention was a combination of treatment approaches already 
investigated separately (e.g. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy). Since the 
current review attempts to document the breadth of treatments for the 
symptom of depressive rumination, there were no specific exclusion 
criteria regarding a minimum methodological quality. The studies were 
grouped into two broad thematic categories: interventions aimed at 





Interventions Aimed at Restructuring Cognitive Content Three 
interventions in particular target cognitive content directly: cognitive 
therapy, metacognitive therapy and mindfulness based cognitive therapy. 
Cognitive therapy targets beliefs about the self, others and the 
‘world’. Metacognitive therapy targets beliefs about the usefulness of 
 
rumination and the function of emotions. Mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy promotes a disengagement from positive, negative and neutral 





Cognitive therapy for depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) has 
been widely researched and evaluated. Numerous reviews and meta- 
analyses suggest that it is an effective treatment for mild to moderate 
depression (e.g. Dobson, 1989; DeRubeis & Crits-Christoph, 1998). 
 
Traditional cognitive therapy attempts to alleviate repetitive distressing 
cognitive content by either inferential challenge (i.e., manipulation of the 
subjective beliefs regarding the probability of an adverse event occurring) 
or evaluative challenge (i.e. manipulation of the subjective beliefs 
regarding the consequences of an event). In both cases, the challenge is 
at the level of cognitive content, that is, the emphasis is upon the 
semantic aspects of the cognition rather than the procedural or algorithmic 
aspects which may underlie the experience of the specific cognitive 
content. 
 
Nevertheless, cognitive therapy has been shown to be effective in 
reducing the length of a depressive episode (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & 
Beck, 2006) and preventing relapse (DeRubeis & Crits-Christoph, 1998). 
In contrast, depressive rumination has been linked with prolonged and 
exacerbated symptoms of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991a). 
Therefore, it is possible that cognitive therapy may also promote an 
indirect reduction in depressive rumination. Indeed, cognitive therapy 
techniques have been associated with a reduction in depressive 
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From the perspective of Joorman’s (2010) model, traditional cognitive 
therapy would promote reappraisal of the cognitive content, reducing its 






In contrast to cognitive therapy, metacognitive therapy does not try to 
challenge the content of depressive thoughts directly. Instead, 
metacognitive therapy attempts to alter the meaning the depressed 
individual assigns to the act of ruminating. Metacognitive therapy for 
depression is a theory driven approach based on the Wells and Matthews’ 
Self-Regulatory Executive Function model (S-REF) of emotional disorders 
(Wells, 2000; Wells & Matthews, 1994). Wells and Papageorgiou (2004) 
define four main goals in metacognitive therapy for depression: (1) to 
introduce the individual to the idea that rumination and selective attention 
to threat are the core of the problem, (2) to help the individual abandon 
ruminative thinking and support them to develop flexible control over their 
attention, (3) to challenge an individual’s beliefs that rumination is useful, 
and (4) to modify the unhelpful beliefs that the individual maintains about 
experiencing emotions, which contribute to fear and relapse. 
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Metacognitive therapy has only recently been formalised as a therapeutic 
approach and as such the empirical evidence for its use in depressive 
rumination is limited. However, Papageorgiou and Wells (2003a) provide 
some initial empirical validation for attention training treatment in clinical 
populations. This is a technique used within the psychological formulation 
framework of metacognitive therapy (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000). The 
only other study exploring the effectiveness of metacognitive therapy 
(Wells, Fischer, Myers, Wheatley, Patel & Brewin, 2009), has provided 
some encouraging findings too, however the limited sample size (four 
patients only) and the lack of a control group limit the generalisation of 
these results. 
 
Metacognitive therapy, compared to cognitive therapy, moves the focus of 
the intervention from the content of the depressiogenic beliefs that 
maintain the negative affect to the beliefs about the ruminative process 
per se. From the perspective of Joorman's (2010) model, metacognitive 
therapy intervenes at the level of cognitive content (at the level of 
inferences and evaluations regarding mental processes). In addition, 
metacognitive therapy also incorporates strategies to reduce individuals’ 
sustained attentional focus upon the ruminative content. This might 
include challenging beliefs about the usefulness of rumination as well as 
simple behaviour strategies to redirect the attention away from the 
ruminative content. This approach should be differentiated from 
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interventions aiming at strengthening directly the underlying executive 





Mindfulness involves maintaining receptive attention and non-evaluative 
moment-to-moment awareness of mental processes and states (Brown, 
Ryan & Creswell, 2007a). From this perspective, all pleasant as well as 
unpleasant feelings and thoughts are openly accepted as transient internal 
states. It is suggested that a purely observant mindful stance allows for 
unprejudiced information processing (Brown, Ryan & Creswell, 2007b), that 
is, the individual is encouraged to focus upon on-going experience without 
engaging in evaluation of the depressiogenic content. 
 
Mindfulness interventions teach breathing and relaxation exercises and 
promote an openness and acceptance to emotional experiences 
irrespective of their valence (Zylowska, Ackerman, Yang, Futrell, Horton, 
Hale, et al., 2008). Mindfulness is associated with higher emotional 
intelligence (attunement to others), improved self-control as well as 
reduced symptoms of psychopathology such as neuroticism, anxiety and 
depression (Brown et al., 2007b). Indeed, mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy (MBCT; Segal, Teasdale & Williams, 2002), a protocol-based 
treatment for emotional disorders, has been shown to be an effective 
treatment for individuals who suffer with symptoms of depression and to 
compare favourably with treatment as usual for those who have 
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experienced three or more major depressive episodes (Ma & Teasdale, 
 
2004). It is suggested that mindfulness interventions work by promoting 
an experiential self-focus, which reduces analytical self-focus (Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001). By reducing analytical self-focus, a depressed individual 
could learn how to break the learnt association between depressed mood 




Ramel, Goldin, Carmona and McQuaid (2004) found that mindfulness 
training reduced rumination in individuals with lifetime mood disorders 
(including depression). They postulated that the main change promoted 
by mindfulness training involved reduction in ruminative thinking. They 
found that mindfulness training lead to reductions in ruminative thinking, 
even after controlling for reductions in affective symptoms and 
dysfunctional beliefs. In addition, a follow-up study suggested that the 
more mindfulness meditation was reportedly practiced, the less 
rumination was experienced. Similar results have been reported in other 
studies (e.g. Deyo, Kimberly, Ong, Koopman, 2009). 
 
Metacognitive therapy attempts to modify the inferential and evaluative 
aspects of the individual’s response to depressiogenic content. By 
encouraging an "experiential focus", the learnt association between the 
depressiogenic cognitive content and the evoked emotional reaction is 
reduced. Once again, and in common with metacognitive therapy, this 
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mechanism of change does not intend to directly remediate the cognitive 
control of working memory, which Joorman (2010) suggested was the 
main vulnerability factor for the development of depressive rumination. 
 
Summary of Cognitive Therapies 
 
 
Within the Joorman (2010) model, the act of rumination blocks the 
positive reappraisal of the eliciting situation. Both Cognitive and 
Metacognitive Therapies seek to facilitate the reappraisal eliciting 
situation. Cognitive therapy attempts to do this by directly challenging the 
content of depressive rumination, whereas metacognitive therapy 
challenges beliefs and behaviours focussed upon the ruminative process 
itself. Mindfulness-based interventions also attempt to reduce the impact 
of depressive rumination upon reappraisal by encouraging the individual to 
take a non-evaluative position with regard to cognitive content. 
 
Overall, it appears that all Cognitive Therapies evaluated are effective in 
manipulating different aspects of cognitive continent at the level of 
appraisal. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between cognitive therapy 
and ‘third wave’ interventions, such as mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy and metacognitive therapy. Whereas cognitive therapy alters the 
inferences of the actual beliefs, ‘third wave’ interventions focus upon 






Cognitive interventions have tended to focus on the reappraisal of 
depressiogenic cognitive content or evaluative beliefs regarding cognitive 
processes, behaviours and emotions. Within the context of Joorman's 
(2010) model, cognitive interventions have tended to predominantly focus 
upon the blocking of on-going processing of ruminative content and 
reducing the accessibility of mood incongruent material. 
 
Behavioural interventions derive from classical and operant learning 
theory. Behavioural interventions tend to focus on abolishing the 






Distractive coping is defined as “actively turning one’s attention away from 
one’s depressive symptoms on to pleasant or neutral thoughts and 
actions” (Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009, p. 224). The original response styles 
theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991a) argued that positive distractions were 
an adaptive response to depression. Rumination was perceived in direct 
opposition to distraction. Distraction leads to improved mood through 
refocusing attention on positive aspects, in contrast to rumination which 
focuses attentional resources upon the depressiogenic content. 
 
The evidence for the efficacy of distraction is equivocal. Some studies 
report a negative correlation between rumination and distraction in 
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clinically depressed populations (e.g. Bagby & Parker, 2001), while other 
studies report a positive correlation (e.g. Schmaling, Dimidjian, Katon & 
Sullivan, 2002) or no correlation (e.g. Kuehner& Webber, 1999). 
 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco and Lyubomirsky (2008) argue that these 
inconsistent findings might be attributable to a lack of standardisation in 
the cohort of participants with respect to variables such as gender, age 
and mental health status. They also argue that the way that distraction is 
operationalized in research studies may be insufficient. Studies 
investigating the relationship between rumination and distraction tend to 
utilise the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991b). 
The distraction sub-scale of the RRS is comprised of 11 activities which 
are generally pleasurable, for example, “do something you enjoy” and “go 
 
to a favourite place to get your mind off your feelings”. These 11 activities 
are rated on a Likert scale. Individuals with a higher score are considered 
to have engaged more in distraction. This scale, however, lacks a measure 
of engagement with the distracting activity. For example, there could be 
depressed individuals who engage in a number of such activities, whilst 
still being distracted by their ruminative thoughts. There could also be 
other depressed individuals who engage in a limited number of distracting 
activities, but pour their full attention into it and so do not ruminate as 
much. This explanation would also be in line with laboratory studies which 
consistently demonstrate that inducing a positive focus on depressed 
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Accordingly, distraction based interventions attempt to reduce rumination 
by diminishing the established operations associated with the cognitions 





Thought stopping is a procedure where an aversive stimulus is introduced 
to produce a response different from the undesirable one (Wolpe, 1973). 
In this procedure, the therapist shouts “STOP!” or delivers another 
aversive stimulus such as a painful shock when the treated individual 
engages in depressive rumination. As the treatment progresses, the 
treated individual learns to implement the procedure themselves by saying 
 
or thinking “STOP!”, usually followed by deliberate and positive self-talk. 
Many variations have emerged whereby the individual inflicts an aversive 
stimulus upon themselves, such slapping and elastic band on their wrist or 
pinching themselves. Accordingly, it is possible to view thought stopping 
as an extreme form of a distraction based intervention. 
 
 
Thought stopping has a long tradition. It has been shown to be a 
successful treatment for a range of undesirable psychological conditions 
such as anger problems (Feindler & Ecton, 1986), obsessional ruminations 
(Emmelkamp & Kwee, 1977), post-traumatic stress disorder (Hickling & 
Blancard, 1999) and indeed depression (Peden, Rayens, Hall & Beebe, 
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2001; Paden, Rayens & Hall, 2005; Peden, Rayens, Hall & Grant, 2005). 
Nevertheless, thought stopping is considered by some as a treatment only 
to be used only under strict conditions and with potential adverse effects 
(Brown, O’Leary & Barlow, 1993; Ellis, 1998; Haddock, Slade, Bentall, 
Reid & Faragher, 1998). 
 
 
More recently, some theorists and researchers have argued that it is an 
ineffective, even counterproductive, technique (e.g. Hannan & Tolin, 
2005). For example, Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes and Scott (1999) argue that 
since depressed individuals are already very likely to use thought 
suppression to control negatively valenced thought, and this appears to 
worsen depressive mood, alternative techniques to thought suppression 
should be preferred instead. Such an interpretation of the research findings 
has been argued to be limited (Bakker, 2009), because depressed 
individuals may simply have more to suppress or they may be poorer at 
suppressing and may need additional coaching in this. In addition, 
evidence does not exist to suggest that pathological symptoms are 
exacerbated following thought stopping interventions (Bakker, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, drawing from the Jorrman (2010) model, aversion based 
interventions attempt to reduce rumination by reducing or abolishing the 
established operations associated with the cognitions and moods that 





A large number of studies suggest that exercise is associated with mental 
health (Arent, Landers, & Etnier, 2000; Biddle, 2000; Lawlor, 2001). 
Stathopoulou, Powers, Berry, Smits and Otto (2006) conducted a meta- 
analysis for the use of exercise as a treatment for depression. The results 
are compelling and in favour of exercise irrespective of the modality of 
exercise (i.e. aerobic and resistance training) (e.g. Martinsen, Hoffart & 
Solberg, 1989). There was, however, a dose-response relationship. For 
example, Dunn, Trivedi, Kampert, Clark and Chambliss (2005) found that 
a five-time-a-week workout totalling an expenditure of 17.5 kcal/kg was 
more effective than a three-time-a-week totalling 7.0 kcal/kg or flexibility 
exercises. 
 
Stathopoulou et al. (2006) argued that exercise improves well-being 
through a variety of mechanisms, such as neurochemical, by regulating 
sleep, by increasing action tendencies in people with depression as well as 
directly affecting cognitive factors. Craft (2005) studied whether a 9-week 
exercise programme of moderate-intensity could lead to a change in 
ruminative response style. All participants were females diagnosed with 
clinical depression. As anticipated, exercise reduced overall symptoms of 
depression by the third week, mirroring previous findings. In addition, all 
participants reported a reduced use of ruminative strategies across time. 
Similar studies involving male participants have not been conducted. In 
the light of the evidenced qualitative differences between genders both in 
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the intensity of depression and levels of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
 
1991a), these findings may not be consistent between both men and 
women. 
 
Once again, the mechanism of change associated with behavioural 
activation interventions is centred on controlling the activation of negative 
cognitions and negative mood, and thus inhibiting the ruminative cycle. 
 
 
Graded Exposure and Habituation Training 
 
Gradual exposure involves the controlled exposure to the upsetting 
stimulus. This leads to repeated activation of the fear structures with 
concurrent elimination of avoidance rituals and escape behaviours. This 
procedure tends to lead to a reduction in the anxiety levels surrounding 
the troubling stimulus. A graded hierarchy of experiences is usually 
developed collaboratively with the individual who is then exposed 
sequentially to them. The intervention concludes once there is only 
minimal anxious arousal in the presence of the troubling stimulus. 
 
In vivo and imaginal gradual exposure has been used with success in a 
number of psychological disorders characterised by repetitive thought 
patterns such as Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (e.g. Antony &Swinson, 





Rachman (1980) and Teasdale (1999) speculated that principles of 
exposure may apply to treatment of symptoms of depression. Exposure- 
based cognitive therapy (EBCT; Hayes & Harris, 2000) combines exposure 
techniques with techniques from cognitive therapies. EBCT is a structured 
intervention developed around developing toleration of fear of sadness 
through expressive writing, by gradually increasing affective charge during 
therapeutic sessions over a period of 20 weeks. Outcome studies on the 
effectiveness of EBCT are currently limited albeit encouraging (Hayes, 
Feldman, Beevers, Laurenceau et al., 2007). 
 
The mechanism of change associated with graded exposure and 
habituation training is focused upon inhibiting the learnt association 
between internal or external eliciting cognition (often negative cognitions) 




Summary of Behavioural Interventions 
 
When viewed from the perspective of the Joorman (2010) model, 
behavioural interventions for rumination predominantly target a reduction 
in the activation of negative cognitions and of negative mood (segment A 
of Joorman's model; see Figure 1) whereas Cognitive therapies focus upon 
the effects of rumination upon the appraisal system (segment C of 
Joorman's model; see Figure 1). "Traditional" cognitive therapy involves 
direct challenging of the content of depressive rumination, whereas 
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metacognitive therapy challenges the beliefs and behaviours regarding the 
ruminative process itself. Mindfulness-based interventions attempt to 
control the impact of depressive rumination by encouraging the individual 
to take a non-evaluative position with regard to the specific 








There is evidence for the efficacy of interventions aiming at restructuring 
cognitive content, such as cognitive therapy, metacognitive therapy and 
mindfulness based cognitive therapy. The mechanisms of change for these 
therapies appear to be predominately by modifying appraisals made by 
the ruminating individual. Equally, there is evidence for the efficacy of 
behavioural interventions. Behavioural interventions appear to work by 
stopping or disrupting the activation of mood congruent cognitions. These 
mechanisms of change are expressed within the model of cognitive 
inhibition and emotion regulation proposed by Joorman (2010). However, 
this model also predicts that interventions remediating deficits in the 
control of working memory and specifically in cognitive inhibition would be 
equally efficacious; however, there is currently no research in this area. 
Further, there may be clear benefits in terms of reducing vulnerabilities in 




Clearly this poses an area of omission in the current arsenal of 
intervention strategies since remediating the individual’s ‘ability’ for 
cognitive inhibition (for both emotional and non-emotional content) could 
reduce the likelihood of descending into a spiral of continuous rumination 
on depressiogenic themes and consequently reduce the likelihood of 
further recurrence of depressed mood. Furthermore, it is a corollary of 
Joorman’s model (2010) that improving cognitive inhibition skills would 
not necessarily act in competition to other interventions and may be 
implemented alongside other interventions to better equip the individual 
with the requisite skills to protect themselves from future episodes of 
depression (e.g. Watkins et al., 2007). 
 
Cognitive remediation therapy focuses upon improving specific cognitive 
functions. It achieves this either by helping the individual exercise the 
area of poor cognitive function or by helping the individual exercise other 
compensatory cognitive functions. Cognitive remediation therapy focuses 
upon the underlying processes rather than the content of thought and 
perception. It promotes a functional reorganisation of cognitive operations 
that reduce the use of the deficient cognitive strategy and remedy the 
underlying neurocognitive deficits. In practice, it involves the engagement 
of individuals in stimulating activities that target the development of the 
deficient cognitive skills without the distress of focusing on the negative 
issues of their mental illness. It has been utilised successfully in people 
with brain injury (Rohling, Faust, Beverly, Demakis, 2009), dyslexia 
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(Broom & Doctor, 1995), schizophrenia (Demily & Nicolas, 2008) and 
anorexia nervosa (Baldock & Tchanturia, 2007). 
 
Attention process training for example (Park, Proulx & Towers, 1999; 
Sohlberg, Johnson, Paule, Raskin & Mateer, 2001) is a widely used 
rehabilitation programme designed to remediate attention deficits in 
individuals with brain injury. The training is comprised of hierarchically 
organised tasks that exercise different components of attention such as 
sustained, alternating, divided and selective attention. This programme 
has been shown to place increased demands on both the attentional 
control and the working memory systems, indeed, the systems that 
according to Joorman (2010) are also deficient in individuals who suffer 
from depressive rumination and depression. There is convincing evidence 
of the effectiveness of training programmes such as this in individuals with 
traumatic brain injury (Cicerone, Dahlberg, Kalmar, Langenbahn, Malec, 
Bergquist, et al.; 2000; Cicerone, Dahlberg, Malec, Langenbahn, Felicetti, 
Kneipp, et al., 2005; Cicerone, Langenbahn, Braden, Malec, Kalmar, Fraas, 
et al., 2011), but the effectiveness of such training for the reduction of 
symptoms of depression remains untested. 
 
In light of the presented evidence, depressive rumination has been argued 
to be a core and characteristic symptom of depression. Through this 
review, it has become apparent that current interventions used to treat 
these conditions focus primarily upon remediating the subjective meaning 
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that the individual holds about their current condition. By doing so, they 
place varied, but nevertheless limited, emphasis on increasing cognitive 
flexibility and remediating cognitive functioning of working memory. This 
article has highlighted an absence of research investigating the usefulness 
of attentional and memory remediating techniques on individuals with 
depression, and proposes that this direction could inform novel 
interventions and new therapeutic modalities for the treatment of 
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COGNITIVE CONTROL OF WORKING MEMORY: COMPARISON OF 










Previous research has shown that rumination underpins diverse 
psychological disorders. Depressive rumination has been associated with 
poor executive control of working memory when negative emotional 
valenced stimuli are involved. This leads to poor reappraisal of problematic 
cognitions and exacerbation of symptoms. Cognitive inhibition appears to 
be at the core of the dysfunction in the executive control of working 
memory when valenced stimuli are involved. However, little research 
exists on the deficits in the executive control of working memory in 





The n-back methodology was implemented to compare set inhibition and 
set switching cost of neutrally valenced information between thirty 





Individuals diagnosed with depression experienced significant set 
switching cost, but not set inhibition cost. Furthermore, rumination was 
found to be unrelated to both set switching and set inhibition, whereas 
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This study suggests the existence of a general deficit in executive control 
of working memory in those with depression and that this is independent 
of the valence of presented stimuli. This moves the emphasis away for the 
emotional significance from the cognitive representations to the cognitive 
processes. Rumination is discussed in light of these findings, and 










Cognitive control of working memory: 









Unconstructive repetitive thinking underlies a number of taxonomically 
diverse mental health problems (Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). 
Conditions as diverse as post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive 
compulsive disorder, social anxiety, depression, dysthymia and 
schizophrenia include unconstructive repetitive thinking as a core clinical 
characteristic. Unconstructive repetitive thinking is independent of the 
degree of physiological arousal, in that it occurs in disorders associated 
with increased arousal (e.g., OCD, social anxiety, phobia) as well as 
reduced arousal (e.g., depression and dysthymia). 
 
Depressive rumination has been associated with poor inhibitory control 
over working memory representations of emotionally valenced stimuli. 
Theories that are predominantly motivated by clinical considerations have 
tended to emphasise the attention capture associated with emotionally 
valenced information (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; 
Papageorgiou & Siegle, 2003). This notion is in line with the 
conceptualisation of depressive rumination in the response styles theory 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubomirsky, 2008), whereby depressive 
rumination is perceived as “a mode of responding to distress that involves 
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repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of distress and on the 
possible causes and consequences of these symptoms. [Depressive] 
rumination does not lead to active problem solving to change [individuals’] 
circumstances surrounding these symptoms. Instead, people who are 
ruminating remain fixated on the problems and on their feelings about 




Alternatively, other models of rumination have postulated a failure of the 
cognitive control systems to inhibit emotional information that is no longer 
task relevant. The model presented by Joorman (2010) suggests that 
negative events trigger mood congruent retrieval of negatively toned 
cognitions and memories with which to interpret on-going experience. 
With impairment of the inhibition in working memory the individual will 
experience greater difficulty switching from negative toned cognitions and 
memories, resulting in increased rumination on depressiogenic themes, 
decreased reappraisal of on-going experience and further reinforcing of the 
accessibility of negative themed memories and appraisals. Overtime this 
process increases long-term retrieval of negative toned material, and 
reinforces the axiomatic acceptance of the content of depressiogenic 
rumination. 
 
The Joorman (2010) model suggests two complementary processes in 
executive control of working memory. Firstly, the no longer relevant 
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representations in working memory require depotentiation either 
automatically through competitive inhibition from the activation of other 
mental representations or through the self-directed inhibition by the 
reallocation of attentional resources. Secondly, the current goal relevant 
representations require potentiation within working memory resources. 
Accordingly, problematic rumination might occur via a failure of the 
inhibitory or the potentiating subsystems. The failure to potentiate the 
current goal relevant representations would result in an inability to switch 
from the no longer relevant stimulus to the new stimulus. Alternatively, a 
failure of the inhibitory subsystem would result in increased competition 
between the no longer relevant stimulus and the goal relevant stimulus 
such that sustained attention is impeded and the individual finds 








Deficits in cognitive inhibition may be responsible for a lack of personal 
control of working memory representations (as suggested by the 
ruminative response styles theory and the Joorman (2010) model). 
However, a number of studies have failed to demonstrate these attentional 
biases in those with depression (MacLeod, Tata & Mathews, 1987; Mogg, 
Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993). Consequently, Williams, Watts, 
Macleod & Mathews (1997) proposed an alternative model whereby 
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depression did not affect attention functioning but instead functioned by 
biasing post-attentional elaboration. Therefore, according to this 
conceptualisation, depressive biases would be found in recall tasks, but 
not in selective attention tasks. However, there are some conditions where 
depressed individuals appear to be characterised by attentional bias. For 
example, recent dot probe task studies reported selective attention in 
depression under conditions of long stimuli exposures (Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, Yue & Joorman, 2004) and under supraliminal conditions 
(Mogg et al., 1993). According to Bradley, Mogg and Lee (1997), these 
results suggest that an attentional bias for negative information exists 
among depressed individuals. Although depressed individuals may not 
actively direct their attention towards negative information, once negative 
information captures their attention, they may have more difficulty in 
disengaging from it. 
 
It has been suggested that similar processes may underlie both selective 
retrieval from memory and selective attention in external stimuli 
(Anderson & Spellman, 1995). Accordingly, if depression leads to 
inhibitory dysfunction in attention, depression may also lead to inhibitory 
dysfunction in memory. This memory dysfunction would be particularly 
evident in tasks of intentional forgetting (Bjork, 1972). The idea behind 
studies in intentional forgetting is to instruct at some point the 
participants to forget items that have been presented and encoded. The 
instruction could be explicit, for example, by informing the participant that 
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the items will not be tested again. The instruction could also be implicit, 
whereby a sequential task requires the participant to “get rid” of the code 
just stored in working memory. To achieve intentional forgetting, the 
participant would have to utilise inhibitory processes. 
 
A number of studies suggest differential forgetting effects between 
depressed and non-depressed participants in methodologies that 
implemented negatively valent stimuli. For example, Power, Dalgleish, 
Claudio, Tata and Kentish (2000) found that when dysphoric and non- 
dysphoric participants were asked to make valence judgements about 
presented words and to remember them at the same time, they both 
showed similar directed forgetting effects for both positive and negative 
words. However, when they were asked to rate the presented words in 
relation to self rather than simply provide pleasantness ratings, the 
demonstrated differential forgetting where non-dysphoric participants 
recalled more positive than negative words in the “forget” instruction. 
Finally, when depressed participants were asked to forget negative 
adjectives, they performed worse than anxious and normal controls. These 
findings suggest that when depressed or dysphoric participants are asked 
to forget negatively valence stimuli, they perform worse at inhibiting the 
information from their working memory than other participants. 
 
More specifically, Joormann and Gotlib (2010) used a negative affective 
priming task to assess associations between inhibition and use of 
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rumination, reappraisal, and expressive suppression. Not only did 
depressed participants exhibit the predicted lack of inhibition when 
processing negative material, but reduced inhibition of negative material 
was associated with greater rumination, less use of reappraisal and more 
use of expressive suppression. 
 
These findings are exemplary of a deficit in executive control of working 
memory and have been replicated in a number of studies (e.g. Hertel & 
Gerstle, 2003; Joorman, Hertel, Brozovich & Botlib, 2005). 
 
Accordingly, there is converging evidence of deficits in executive control 
processes in individuals with depression. Whitmer and Banich (2007) 
examined the specific cognitive mechanisms underlying this inhibitory 
deficit, specifically whether rumination was associated with an inability to 
switch attention away from old to new information (set-switching cost) or 
with an inability to effectively inhibit the processing of previously relevant 
information (set-inhibition cost). Increased executive control of working 
memory would be indicated by low set-switching cost and high set- 
inhibition cost. Using the task-switching paradigm reported by Mayr and 
Keele (2000), Whitmer and Banich (2007) demonstrated that depressive 
rumination was associated with a deficit in inhibiting prior mental sets 
(set-inhibition cost) whereas angry and intellectual rumination was 
associated with difficulties in switching to a new task set (set-switching 
cost), but not with inhibition of a prior task set. However, doubt remains 
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as to the generalizability of this effect to individuals with clinical 
depression as Whitmer and Banich (2007) used a sample of 43 
participants selected on the basis of being the top 10% (high ruminators) 
and bottom 10% (nonruminators) in a population of 776 psychology 
undergraduates. To date, this effect has not been replicated in individuals 





In the current study, a cross-sectional research design was utilized 
comparing set-inhibition cost and set-switching cost between individuals 
with a diagnosis of depression and individuals without a diagnosis. 
 
We hypothesized that people with a diagnosis of depression would have 
difficulties in the executive control of their working memory. This would be 
evident by demonstrating difficulties in inhibiting previously relevant 
information (low set-inhibition cost) and/or by demonstrating difficulties in 












Twenty-seven females and 35 males participated in this study. The control 
participants were recruited from undergraduate students participating at 
the Research Participation Scheme at the University of Birmingham. The 
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participants meeting inclusion criteria were required to complete both the 
screening questionnaires as well as the computerised assessment in the 
same session. The inclusion criteria for this recruitment route were that 
they were fluent in English and had no significant sensory difficulties and 
that they scored within the non-clinical range on all of the clinical 
subscales of the SCL-90-R. 
 
A total number of 45 non-clinical participants were approached. After 
screening with the SCL-90-R, 14 participants were excluded from the 
control group as they showed clinically significant scores on one or more 
of the clinical subscales of the SCL-90-R. 
 
The mental health participants were recruited from patients attending 
Primary Care Mental Health Teams in the West Midlands area. Potential 
participants were identified from patients attending community mental 
health services who were currently experiencing symptoms of depression. 
The inclusion criteria for the participants attending psychiatric services 
were that they were fluent in English and had no significant sensory 
difficulties. Inclusion to the mental health group was defined in terms of 





The Ruminative Response Styles (RRS) questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) is a 22-item, four point Likert scale with anchors of 1 = 
'Never' to 4 = ' Always'. This self-report questionnaire assesses how 
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frequently participants ruminate on their feelings of sadness or depression. 
Specifically, it assesses the respondents’ degree of absorption with the 
symptoms and consequences of having a depressed mood. The RRS has 
good internal consistency (Cronback's a = .82), moderate to high test-
retest reliability over one year (r = .47, p < .001) and has been shown to 
be predictive of depression (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Webber, 1999; 
Nolan, Roberts & Gotlib, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker & Larson, 1994; 
Nolen-Hoeksma, 2000; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). 
 
Treynor, Gonzalez and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) have argued that the RRS 
is comprised of three subscales, namely reflection, brooding and 
depression-related. ‘Reflection’ questions are related with problem-solving 
and coping, in contrast with ‘brooding’ questions that focus around self- 
criticism and the ‘depression’ related questions that describe general 
symptoms of depression. 
 
Symptom Checklist 90 – Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994) is a multi- 
dimensional self-report questionnaire. It consists of 90 items covering 
eight dimensions of psychological distress: phobic anxiety, anxiety, 
depression, somatization, obsessive-compulsivity, distrust and 
interpersonal sensitivity, hostility and insomnia. The overall total score of 
the SCL-90-R is used to represent psychoneuroticism. Each item is 
reported on a five-point Likert scale with anchors from 1 – 'Not at all' to 5 
= 'Extremely'. The participants are asked to report the extent to which the 
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symptoms were manifest during the week preceding the day of answering 
the questionnaire. The SCL-90-R has been shown to possess good 
construct (Derogatis & Cleary, 1977, Roskin & Dasberg, 1983) and 





This study followed the specific procedures outlined in the task switching 
paradigms of Mayr and Keele (2000). Participants were required to identify 
the spatial location of a target item in a 2x2 matrix. On each trial the 
stimuli could vary according to (a) shape, (b) colour or (c) orientation. 
The participant was cued to the dimension that should be used to identify 
the target item by a word which appeared in the middle of the matrix prior 
to the presentation of the stimuli. For example, if the respondent was 
cued to “colour” then the top right quadrant would be the correct response 
for the slide shown in Figure 1. Alternatively, if the respondent was cued 






Figure 1: An example of the 2×2 stimulus matrix. 
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The sequencing of cues across trials allows for the separation of inhibition 
and switching components of working memory (see Figure 2). 
 
Inhibition Trials are defined as those in which the cue is different from the 
cue in the immediately preceding trial (n-1), but the same as the cue two 
trials back (n-2; e.g., orientation-colour-orientation). Inhibitory trials 
require both set switching and n-2 inhibition. The sequence ‘colour – 
shape – colour’ requires that colour is the initial selected response. This 
then requires a set switch in order to respond to shape at the second trial 
and the inhibition of colour from the previous trial. On the third trial, 
response time is a function of switching from shape to colour and the 
continuing inhibition effect upon colour from the previous ‘colour – shape’ 
sequence. Accordingly, in the sequence ‘colour – shape – colour’, 
responding to the third component requires a set switch back to colour 
which may be impeded by its previous inhibition during the response to 







Trial Types % of Total Trials 
Trials Requiring a Set-Switch: 
Inhibitory (e.g., colour – shape – colour)  28.5% 
Control (orientation – shape - colour) 28.25% 
Unclassified (colour – colour – shape; 
20.0% 
orientation – orientation – colour) 
Trials Without a Set-Switch: 
Repeat Trials (e.g. colour – colour) 21.75% 
Measures of Executive Function 
Set Inhibition Cost 
 
How Measured: RT to Inhibitory Trials – RT to Control Trials 
 
Relationship to 
Larger Difference; Better Executive Ability 
Performance: 
Set-Switching Cost 





Smaller Difference; Better Executive Ability 
Performance: 
Figure 2. Trial Types and Measures of Executive Function. All calculations 
 
are based on reaction time. 
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Control Trials are defined as those trials in which the cue is different from 
the cue on the preceding two trials. This may take two forms; firstly, 
where all three cues are different (e.g., orientation – shape - colour); 
secondly, where the cue is different from a previously repeated trial (e.g., 
orientation – orientation - colour). Similar to Inhibition Trials, Control 
Trials require two set switches, but differ in that they do not require n-2 
back inhibition. 
 
Repeat Trials are defined as those trials that do not require a set switch 
 
(e.g. colour - colour or shape - shape). 
 
 
Set Switching Cost is defined as the additional time it takes to respond to 
non-inhibitory trials that require the use of a different task set than used 
in the previous trial (e.g., change from colour to orientation as a task set) 
as compared with repeat trial, in which the same task sets are used on 
two trials (e.g. orientation followed by orientation). 
 
Set Switching Cost is thought to reflect the time needed to reconfigure the 
cognitive processes involved in the representation of the to-be-used task 
set. Thus, if ruminators have switching difficulties, ruminative tendency 
should be associated with increased Set Switching Costs. 
 
Inhibition Cost is defined as the extra time involved in switching back to a 
recently abandoned task set (e.g., orientation at the end of an orientation 
– colour - orientation sequence) compared with the cost of switching to a 
less recently abandoned task (e.g., orientation at the end of a shape – 
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colour - orientation sequence). This is considered a measure of set 
inhibition not confounded by switching abilities (as in both inhibition and 
control conditions the to-be-used cue had been preceded by at least two 
task switches). 
 
When a respondent switches from one task to another, the first task set is 
thought to be inhibited to allow a faster and smoother transition to the 
second. Thus, if the participant returns to the inhibited task immediately 
afterward, it takes more time than switching to a less recently abandoned 
talk because of the extra time needed to overcome the inhibition of the 
prior task set’s representation (Mayr & Keele, 2000). Hence, if ruminators 
cannot effectively inhibit prior task sets, they should have less inhibition to 
overcome than non-ruminators do and should therefore have smaller time 











In order to identify outliers in the inhibition and set switch, a pairwise 
Euclidean distance matrix was calculated. The distances for each individual 
were summed and are presented in Appendix 1. As can be seen from 
these graphs, participants 11 and 47 showed marked dissimilarity to the 
 
rest of the participants (most probably the result of inappropriate test 
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taking behaviour) and were therefore eliminated from subsequent 
analyses. Additional data from 14 healthy control participants were 
removed from the analysis because they scored in the clinical range on 
one or more of the SCL-90-R subscales. 
 
The final dataset consisted of 60 participants. Thirty participants suffered 
from no psychiatric distress (healthy controls) as measured by the SCL- 
90-R (Derogatis, 1994) and all of the mental health participants scored in 
the clinical range on the depression subscale of the SCL-90-R. 
 
The average accuracy of the included participants’ responses was 95.74% 
(SD=2.14, min = 89.5%, max = 95.74%). All inferential analyses were 
conduct only on runs for which the correct response was provided for each 






Differences between Depressed and Healthy Control Groups on the SCL- 
 
90-R and the Ruminative Response Scale 
 
 
A comparison of the means between the healthy controls and the mental 
health group showed that the two groups had markedly different profiles. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the mental health group scored significantly 
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Symptom Total       
* p < .001. Note. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. 
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In addition, depressed participants scored significantly higher in the total 
score of the RRS as well as its subscales of depression and brooding, but 









Differences in Engagement and Quality of Rumination between Depressed 
 








 M SD  M SD t-test 





































* p < .0125 (Bonferroni correction applied) 
 











A 2 (Group: Healthy control vs. Depressed participants) by 4 (Trial Type: 
Inhibitions vs. Repeat vs. Unclassified vs. Control) repeat measures 




conditions. A significant Mauchley Sphericity test was reported (W = 0.39; 
 
5=53.54; p< 0.01) therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of 
significance was employed in further analyses. A significant interaction 
effect for trial type by Group was observed (F3,174=14.44; Epsilon = 0.60; 







Figure 3: Differences between depressed and healthy control participants 
on inhibition, repeat, unclassified and control trials. The vertical axis 
represents reaction time in milliseconds, whereas the horizontal axis 






In both the depressed and healthy control participants the control trials 
differed significantly from the repeat and unclassified trials but not from 
the inhibition trials (see Table 4, Appendix 2). For all trial types the 
depressed participants showed greater reaction times than did the healthy 
control participants: t(58) = 104.01, p < .001 for inhibition, t(58) = 
78.04, p < .01 for repeat, t(58) = 70.61, p < .05 for unclassified, and 
 







Differences between Depressed and Non-Depressed Groups between Set 
 
Switching and Set Inhibition Cost 
 
 
A mixed two-way ANOVA was calculated to assess differences in set 
switching and set inhibition reaction time between individuals with and 
without mental health difficulties. This analysis revealed a significant 
interaction effect (Wilks’s Lambda = .918, F (1, 58) = 5.19, p = .026, 
partial eta squared =.082) between executive function (set inhibition vs. 
set switching cost) and mental health status (Healthy control vs. 
Participants with mental health difficulties). This statistically significant 
difference between the set inhibition and set-switching cost among 
participants who suffered from depression and those who did not suffer 






Figure 4. Estimated Marginal Means of participants with depression and 
participants without for each of the two executive functions. The vertical 
axis represents the average cost in milliseconds for each of set-inhibition 
and set-switching (horizontal axis). High set-inhibition cost and low set- 






Differences between Depressed and Non-Depressed Groups between Set 
 
Switching and Set Inhibition Cost: Post hoc analysis. 
 
 
Depressed participants were found to be significantly slower (t(44.48) = - 
 
2.37, p = 0.02) when set switching (M = 11.85, SD = 9.69 vs. M = 7.08, 
 
SD = 5.23), but there was no significant difference (t(58) = 1.13, p = 
 
0.26) in set inhibition between the two groups (M = 2.05, SD = 7.91 vs. M 
 
= 4.39, SD = 8.14). There was also a significant effect for the difference 
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between set inhibition and set switching in the control and mental health 
participants (t(58) = 2.27, p = 0.26) with the mental health group 






Correlation analysis of set switching cost, set inhibition and the depression 
 
sub-scale of SCL-90-R 
 
 
There was no significant association between the depression sub-scale 
score of the SCL-90-R and set inhibition cost (r(58) = -0.1, p > .05) but 
there was a positive association between the depression sub-scale and the 
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p > .05 
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RRS total score did not correlate significantly with either set inhibition or 
with set-switching cost. Similarly, neither of the RRS subscales for 
Depression, Brooding and Reflection correlated significantly with set 











As anticipated, responses on the Ruminative Response Scale replicated 
previous findings and showed that individuals with depression experience 
more depressive rumination than those who do not experience distress 
from psychopathology symptoms. In particular, it replicated previous 
research (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Lo, Ho & Hollon, 2008) indicating 
depressed individuals do not differ from healthy controls in their ability for 
reflective thinking, but that they significantly differ in how much they 
engage in depressiogenic rumination and brooding. 
 
It is well established that depressed individuals exhibit a deficit in the 
control of their working memory when confronted with negative emotion 
valence material (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 2000; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), suggesting a deficit in 
executive control of working memory. Given that the stimuli used in this 
76  
 
experiment were not emotionally valenced, our research provides further 
evidence of poor executive control of working memory in individuals who 
suffer from depression and suggests that the deficit in working memory 
exists irrespective of the emotional significance of materials in working 
memory. Specifically, depressed participants demonstrated difficulty in 
changing the content of their working memory rather than in forgetting. 
This finding is important, and provides a novel contribution to the existing 
literature, in that it demonstrates a general deficit of executive control of 
working memory that is independent of the specific content of the stimuli 
and provides support for Joormann and Gotlib's (2010) emphasis upon 
cognitive processes rather than the emotional significance of specific 
cognitive representations. 
 
Previous research and theorists have proposed that a deficit in 
inhibitory control of working memory may be used to explain depressive 
rumination (Hester & Garavan, 2005; Linville, 1996; Ursin, 2005; Watkins 
& Brow, 2002; Witmer & Banich, 2007). These findings were largely based 
upon analogue studies using undergraduate students who were either 
selected on the basis of how much they ruminated or were subjected to 
mood induction procedures to manipulate the respondents’ predilection to 
rumination. The association between such analogue studies of otherwise 
normally functioning individuals and those with clinical depression has not 
provided evidence of causality. 
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The results of the current study, which compares individuals with and 
without current mental health difficulties, does not support the emphasis 
on inhibitory control of working memory. Instead, the current study 
suggests that the deficits in executive control of working memory reflect 
problems of set-switching rather than set inhibition and may reflect 
general difficulties in cortical activation among depressed people. In an 
fMRI task that required depressed and non-depressed participants to 
complete an n-back working memory task, Harvey et al. (2005) notes a 
general “hypofrontality” in depressed participants that was associated with 
an impaired behavioural performance. In this study the depressed patients 
required greater activation within the lateral prefrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate and parietal cortex to maintain a similar level of performance as 
controls during the working memory task. 
 
Understandably, participants who had a diagnosis of depression also 
scored significantly higher on the depression sub-scale of the SCL-90-R 
when compared with healthy control participants. In addition, the analysis 
suggested the higher an individual scored on the depression sub-scale the 
more difficulty they had in set switching. However, there was no 
substantial association between the depressive sub-scale and set 
inhibition cost. This finding may provide evidence that the level of 
depression could be linked to the degree of deficit at the level of cognitive 
processing information already existing in working memory. A greater 
number of depressive symptoms may indicate a greater cognitive deficit. 
78  
 
A lack of association between the depression sub-scale and the RRS was 
unexpected, especially with regard to the brooding and the depression 
subscales of the RRS. This counter-intuitive discrepancy may be due to 
the self-report nature of both scales. Another reason for this discrepancy 
may be because a number of the participants recruited from mental health 
services were already in receipt of cognitive-behaviour therapy. It is 
possible that those participants were already engaging in problem-solving 
cognitive strategies which in turn counteracted the deleterious effect of 
depressive rumination causing this discrepancy. 
 
A possible cognitive deficit in processing neutrally valenced information in 
working memory in people with a diagnosis of depression may be a 
characteristic symptom of their depressive illness rather than a deficit 
which exists among different diagnoses. Moritz, Hubner and Kluwe (2004), 
utilising a similar methodology with people who suffered from obsessive- 
compulsive disorder (OCD) concluded that researchers “should be 
prepared that executive impairments in OCD will not be found with neutral 
(i.e., concern irrelevant) material” (p. 681). In contrast to people with 
depression, there is evidence that verbal and non-verbal memory in 
people with OCD remains intact (Moritz, Kloss, Jahn, Schick & Hand, 
 
2003) and this may also extend to executive function. Although the 
verdict from the research in executive function of individuals who suffer 
from different psychological disorders is still largely inconclusive, such 
differences provide support for disorder-unique deficits. Such differences 
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could prove helpful in defining the assessment, differential diagnosis and 
the development of targeted deficit-specific treatments. 
 
This study also indicates that interventions targeting deficits in the 
executive control of working memory directly, such as cognitive 
remediation therapy may be beneficial for people suffering with 
depressive rumination. The predominant advantage of such an approach 
would be that it could be self-administered using a computer, either as a 
stand-alone intervention or as a homework task to be undertaken as part 
of another therapeutic approach. Furthermore, cognitive remediation tasks 
 
could be incorporated in computer games, which could make this 
intervention accessible to children, adolescents and individuals who would 
not engage in talking therapies or pharmaceutical treatments. It is 
acknowledged, however, that people who suffer from depressive 
rumination are also likely to experience reduce motivation and may only 
engage in interventions, such as cognitive remediation as part of a relapse 
prevention plan only. 
 
A number of factors need to be taken into consideration in future research 
in this area. It is possible that depressed participants who have been 
engaging in treatment for a while have developed strategies that 
counterbalance their depressive ruminative predisposition. Further 
research in this area could take into account the number amount and type 
(e.g., medication, psychotherapy) of support each participant has had. 
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Furthermore, there is evidence that much of the subjective therapeutic 
progress takes place during the first few sessions (Duncan, Miller & 
Hubble, 1999). If self-reported questionnaires are administered during 
that time, responses may express individuals’ hopes and expectations of 
therapy rather than their current symptomatology. In these cases self- 
report measures could be used in combination with other, more objective 
measures. Finally, a matched design with regard to age and gender could 
control for extraneous factors such as gender and dexterity accounted by 
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What was the study about? 
 
This study investigated how people with depression use their short-term 
memory. People with depression tend to ruminate, that is, they go 
repeatedly over negative thoughts in their mind. Rumination takes place 
in short-term memory and can be counterproductive for mental health. 
However, depressed people and people prone to depression find it difficult 
to stop themselves from ruminating negative thoughts about themselves, 
others or the ‘world’ in general. 
 
As rumination occurs in the short-term memory, it is necessary to alter 
what is occupying the short-term memory in order to forget about these 
thoughts and stop ruminating. One can change what is occupying the 
short-term memory either by emptying the contents of it (‘intentionally 
forgetting’) or by replacing the contents of it (switching to thinking about 
something else). 
 
Previous research has shown that people with depression find it more 
difficult to stop themselves from ruminating negative thoughts than 
individuals without depression. However, it has not been investigated 
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whether people with depression also find it more difficult to stop 
themselves from thinking about neutral thoughts too. 
 
If people with depression find it difficult to make changes to their short- 
term memory from neutral thoughts too, when compared with non- 
depressed people, then this may suggest that depressed people have a 
difficulty in controlling their thoughts and the contents of their short-term 
memory in general, and that this may be contributing to the tendency for 







How did the study investigate the way in which individuals use 
their short-term memory? 
Our Study compared the responses from thirty individuals who had a 
diagnosis of depression and thirty individuals who did not have any mental 
health problems. All participants filled in a questionnaire to tell us how 
much they ruminated. In addition, they performed a computerised task 
which assessed their short-term memory. 
 
In this task, participants were asked to pick the ‘odd one out’ of four 
shapes they were shown on the screen. They were told to pick the one 
that was different in terms of colour, shape or orientation, by pressing the 
relevant key on the keyboard. For example, the following figure shows one 
of the slides used. If the participant was asked to pick the odd one out in 
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terms of colour, then the participant would have to press the key 
corresponding to the object on the top right corner. If they were asked to 
pick the odd one out by shape, then this would be the object on the top 
left hand corner. The computer automatically recorded how long it took for 
















All sixty participants had to complete the same sequence of 400 slides. We 
speculated that if depressed participants found it harder to empty their 
short-term memory, that is, they continued to ruminate on the previous 
slide, then they would find it harder to concentrate on making a choice on 
the next slide, and it would therefore take them longer to give a response. 
 
Finally, the sequence of the slides was selected so that it would help us 
separate between the two different ways that we control the content of 
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What were the findings? 
 
As anticipated, we found that individuals who suffer from depression also 
ruminated more than individuals without a diagnosis. In addition, we 
found that people with depression had difficulty switching to thinking 






What are the implications of the findings? 
 
These findings are important because they show a general difficulty in the 
ability of depressed individuals to control the contents of their short-term 
memory. Furthermore, this difficulty appears to be independent of 
whether the presented information is of an emotional nature or not. This 
finding is important because it suggests that there may be an underlying 
cognitive (thinking) problem in people who experience depression. These 




What do these findings mean for the existing treatments of 
depressive rumination and depression? 
To answer this question we will first describe the broad principles that 






How do current psychological interventions work to help an 
individual ruminate less? 
Our review of the literature identified two broad categories that 
encompass psychological interventions for depressed people who 
ruminate. Both categories included a number of distinctive therapeutic 
approaches and interventions. 
 
The first category includes three therapeutic approaches: (a) cognitive 
therapy, (b) metacognitive therapy and (c) mindfulness based cognitive 
therapy. All three therapeutic approaches try to help the depressed 
individual re-evaluate some unhelpful beliefs that are common in 
individuals who experience depression. For example, cognitive therapy 
focuses upon helping the depressed individual to identify whether what 
they ruminate upon holds true or not. Metacognitive therapy and 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy shift the focus of the intervention 
towards exploring the usefulness of the act of ruminating and help the 
individual move away from ruminating, either by challenging the belief 
that an individual has no control over their rumination or by promoting an 
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experiential and non-judgemental attitude towards ruminating. These 
interventions have been shown to reduce ruminating and improve low 
mood. 
 
The second category includes a series of interventions that are based on 
the understanding of how people associate different experiences. Through 
continuous practice, depressed people have learnt that ruminating and 
feeling low go ‘hand in hand’. In fact, they have learnt it so well, that 
starting to ruminate will generate low mood, similar to salivating when 
thinking about tasty food. Interventions in this category try to help the 
depressed individual engage in behaviours that have an opposite effect. 
An example of an intervention that comes under this category is 
 
distraction. If, a depressed individual distracts themselves from 
ruminating, by focusing on pleasant or neutral thoughts, then they will 
experience less or no low mood. Similarly, behavioural activation, another 
form of distraction, involves engaging in pleasurable or neutral physical 
activities instead of ruminating. Such interventions have been shown to 






What does this research suggest? 
 
Our research suggests that individuals who suffer from depression and 
who ruminate may have difficulty in their ability to control a cognitive 
function; that is, to manipulate the contents of their short-term memory 
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and ruminating is the result of this deficit. Furthermore, ruminating makes 
symptoms of depression worse. 
 
Interventions aiming to help individuals develop more control over their 
short-term memory do exist and have been used successfully in treating 
other mental health conditions. However, there is no research on the 
application of these interventions in people who suffer with depression. 
We propose that future research needs to investigate the effectiveness of 







Where can I get more information about this research? 
 
This research is in the public domain and may be accessed by making a 
request to the Main Library at the University of Birmingham using the 

















































Post-hoc analyses between Groups and Trials. 
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Note: The t value for each comparison is reported in bold across the top row. The p value for each comparison is 
 































People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please 
read each of the items bellow and indicate whether you almost never, 
sometimes, often, or almost always think or do each one when your feel 
down, sad or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what 














1. Think about how alone you feel. 
 
2. Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this”. 
 
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness. 
 
4. Think about how hard it is to concentrate. 
 
5. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 
 
6. Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel. 
 
7. Analyse recent events to try to understand why you are 
depressed. 
8. Think about how you don’t seem to feel anything any more. 
 
9. Think “Why can’t I get going?”. 
 
10. Think “Why do I always react this way?” 
 
11. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel like this. 
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12. Write down what you are thinking about and analyse it. 
 
13. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better. 
 
14. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way”. 
 
15. Think “Why do I have problems other people do not have?” 
 
16. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?” 
 
17. Think about how sad you feel. 
 
18. Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults and mistakes. 
 
19. Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything. 
 
20. Analyse your personality to try to understand why you are 
depressed. 
21. Go someplace alone to think about your feelings. 
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INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH 
Clinical Participants 



















We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you 
decide we would like you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it would involve for you. One of our team will go through the 
information sheet with you and answer any questions you have. We‘d 
suggest this should take a few minutes. 
 
Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
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Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if 
you take part. 
 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study 
 
 







PART 1 – Purpose of the study 
 
 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Rumination is a way of responding to distress that involves 
repeatedly focusing on one’s worries and on possible causes and 
consequences. Rumination is a crucial component of depression. 
When someone is ruminating, they occupy their memory by passively 
chewing over the same information time and time again; and 
sometimes they find it hard to stop. It is not surprising then, that 
rumination has been associated with difficulties in controlling what is 
in our memory. In fact, some researchers suggest that people 
ruminate because they find it hard to ignore what is on their mind 
when doing other activities. Since people with depression tend to 
ruminate more, this research attempts to find out if they also find it 




2. Why have I been invited? 
 
Your clinician has identified you as a candidate for this study 





3. Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study 
and go through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we 
will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving a reason. This would not affect the 





4. What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you decide to take part, we will contact you to arrange for a time 
and place to meet. We can meet at your home, the University of 
Birmingham or where you normally meet with your clinician (subject 
to room availability). We will try to accommodate the day and time 
to suit you. Participation to this study is separate to any treatment 
you may receive at present and treatment you may require in the 





5. What if I incur expenses? 
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If you are an NHS patient who makes a trip only for the purpose of 
this study (e.g. if we meet at the University of Birmingham), a total 





6. What will I have to do? 
 
First, we will ask you to complete two questionnaires. This will 
normally take about 15 minutes. Then, you will complete a 
computer-based task, where you will be shown some pictures while 
trying to remember some of the information we will give you. The 




7. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
There are no short-term and long-term side-effects as a result of 




8. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
We cannot promise the study will help you directly, but the 
information we get from this study could help improve the treatment 




9. What if there is a problem? 
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Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the 
study or any possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The 




10. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information 





This completes Part 1. If the information has interested you and you are 
considering participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 






Part 2 – Conduct of the study 
 
 
11. What if relevant new information becomes available? 
 
Sometimes we get new information about the issue being studied. If 
this new information suggests that the study may have an adverse 
effect on you, we will explain this to you before you start. At this 
point, we will either seek your consent again before continuing or 




12. What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
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If you withdraw from the study we will destroy all identifiable 





13. What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask 
to speak to the researchers who will do their best to answer your 
questions on . If you remain unhappy and wish to 
complain formally, you can do this by contacting your local Patient 




In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed 
during the research and this is due to someone‘s negligence then 
you may have grounds for a legal action for compensation against 
The University of Birmingham, but you may have to pay your legal 
costs. In addition, the normal University of Birmingham complaints 




14. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the 
research will be kept strictly confidential, and any information about 
you which leaves the hospital/clinic will have your name and address 





15. Will my GP be informed of my participation? 
Your GP will normally not be informed of your participation. We may 
have to contact your GP if you voluntarily disclose information that 
clearly indicates that you are risk to yourself or someone else. We 





16. What will happen to any information I give? 
 
All data collected will be anonymised and coded before stored in an 
electronic format and analysed. All hardcopies will be kept in a 
locked cabinet. Data will be destroyed after approximately six years 
following the completion of the study. This amount of time is 




17. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
We intend to publish the anonymous results of this study to an 
academic journal. Similarly, a public dissemination document will 
also be created and you are welcome to receive copy. To give us 
your permission to send you a copy of the public dissemination 
document, please provide us with either your email address or your 




18. Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The University of Birmingham organises and funds this study. This 
study is undertaken by the principal investigator towards partial 
fulfilment of the requirements of a doctoral course in Clinical 




19. Who has reviewed this study? 
 
All research with participants from the NHS is looked at by 
independent group of people, called a Research Ethics Committee, 
to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given 
favourable opinion by the National Research Ethics Service 




20. Further information and contact details: 
 




• For specific information about this research project or to 
discuss any concerns, please contact either Nikos Zygouris 
(Primary Investigator) or Dr Christopher Jones (Academic 
Tutor) on . 
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• If you feel that you need advice as to whether you should 
participate. Please contact your GP. 
• If you are unhappy with the study please contact Nikos 
Zygouris or Dr Christopher Jones on . If we 
cannot address your concerns, please contact your local 
Patient Advisory Liaison Service (PALS) on  . 
You can find more information about PALS at: 
http://www.pals.nhs.uk/ 
• If you find that this study raises any issues of concern to you, 
please discuss your concerns with the researcher, your doctor, 
or if you are a student control, you may also wish to seek 
advice from the University Counselling Service. Their 











Study Number: RG 11-140 
 
 











INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH 
Non-Clinical Participants 



















We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you 
decide we would like you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it would involve for you. One of our team will go through the 
information sheet with you and answer any questions you have. We‘d 
suggest this should take a few minutes. 
 
Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
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Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if 
you take part. 
 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study 
 
 







PART 1 – Purpose of the study 
 
 
21. What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Rumination is a way of responding to distress that involves 
repeatedly focusing on one’s worries and on possible causes and 
consequences. Rumination is a crucial component of depression. 
When someone is ruminating, they occupy their memory by passively 
chewing over the same information time and time again; and 
sometimes they find it hard to stop. It is not surprising then, that 
rumination has been associated with difficulties in controlling what is 
in our memory. In fact, some researchers suggest that people 
ruminate because they find it hard to ignore what is on their mind 
when doing other activities. Since people with depression tend to 
ruminate more, this research attempts to find out if they also find it 




22. Why have I been invited? 
 
If you do not receive support for any mental health problems, your 





23. Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study 
and go through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we 
will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at 




24. What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you decide to take part, we will contact you to arrange for a time 
and place to meet. We will normally meet at the University of 





25. What if I incur expenses? 
 
There is no provision for payment of any expenses you incur, but 





26. What will I have to do? 
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First, we will ask you to complete two questionnaires. This will 
normally take about 15 minutes. Then, you will complete a 
computer-based task, where you will be shown some pictures while 
trying to remember some of the information we will give you. The 




27. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
There are no short-term and long-term side-effects as a result of 




28. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
We cannot promise the study will help you directly, but the 
information we get from this study could help improve the treatment 




29. What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the 
study or any possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The 




30. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
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Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information 





This completes Part 1. If the information has interested you and you are 
considering participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 
before making a decision. 
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Part 2 – Conduct of the study 
 
 
31. What if relevant new information becomes available? 
 
Sometimes we get new information about the issue being studied. If 
this new information suggests that the study may have an adverse 
effect on you, we will explain this to you before you start. At this 
point, we will either seek your consent again before continuing or 




32. What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
 
If you withdraw from the study we will destroy all identifiable 





33. What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask 
to speak to the researchers who will do their best to answer your 
questions on . If you remain unhappy and wish to 
complain formally, you can do this by contacting the Director of the 







In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed 
during the research and this is due to someone‘s negligence then 
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you may have grounds for a legal action for compensation against 
The University of Birmingham, but you may have to pay your legal 
costs. In addition, the normal University of Birmingham complaints 




34. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the 




35. Will my GP be informed of my participation? 
 





36. What will happen to any information I give? 
 
All data collected will be anonymised and coded before stored in an 
electronic format and analysed. All hardcopies will be kept in a 
locked cabinet. Data will be destroyed after approximately six years 
following the completion of the study. This amount of time is 




37. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
We intend to publish the anonymous results of this study to an 
academic journal. Similarly, a public dissemination document will 
also be created and you are welcome to receive copy. To give us 
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your permission to send you a copy of the public dissemination 
document, please provide us with either your email address or your 





38. Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The University of Birmingham organises and funds this study. This 
study is undertaken by the principal investigator towards partial 
fulfilment of the requirements of a doctoral course in Clinical 




39. Who has reviewed this study? 
 
All research with participants from the NHS is looked at by 
independent group of people, called a Research Ethics Committee, 
to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given 
favourable opinion by the National Research Ethics Service 




40. Further information and contact details: 
 






• For specific information about this research project or to 
discuss any concerns, please contact either Nikos Zygouris 
(Primary Investigator) or Dr Christopher Jones (Academic 
Tutor) on 
• If you feel that you need advice as to whether you should 
participate. Please contact your GP. 
• If you are unhappy with the study please contact Nikos 
Zygouris or Dr Christopher Jones on . If we 
cannot address your concerns, please contact Dr Jan Oyebode 
(Director of the Clinical Psychology Doctorate) at 
. 
 
• If you find that this study raises any issues of concern to you, 
please discuss your concerns with the researcher, your doctor, 
or if you are a student control, you may also wish to seek 
advice from the University Counselling Service. Their 
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